होमअपराधसुप्रीम कोर्ट ने पीओसीएसओ धारा 29‑30 की मान्यताओं को खंडन कर आरोपी को बरी किया
अपराध

सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने पीओसीएसओ धारा 29‑30 की मान्यताओं को खंडन कर आरोपी को बरी किया

दलील में पेश किए गए प्रमाणों में गवाहियों के बीच प्रमुख विसंगतियों और चिकित्सा‑फोरेंसिक रिपोर्टों की असंगतियों को देखते हुए अदालत ने कहा कि पीओसीएसओ अधिनियम की धारा 29 व 30 के अनुमान उलटे जा सकते हैं और अभियोजन को आरोपी की दोषसिद्धि साबित करने की जिम्मेदारी पूरी नहीं हुई। परिणामस्वरूप, आईपीसी धारा 363 और पीओसीएसओ धारा 6 के तहत लगाए गए आरोपों से आरोपी को बरी कर दिया गया।

20 सितंबर 2026 को 11:05 am बजे
सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने पीओसीएसओ धारा 29‑30 की मान्यताओं को खंडन कर आरोपी को बरी किया

सौजन्य से:- SCC Online

Supreme Court: In 2 appeals challenging the Delhi High Court judgment dated 3 July 2025, which had upheld the appellant’s conviction under Section 363, Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 6, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), the Division Bench of Prashant Kumar Mishra and N.V. Anjaria*, JJ., held that the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30, POCSO Act are rebuttable and do not dispense with the prosecution’s obligation to establish the foundational facts of the offence and prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. On examining the evidence, the Court found material contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, coupled with medical and forensic evidence which did not support the allegation of penetrative sexual assault. Holding that the appellant had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption and that the prosecution had failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court acquitted him of the offences under Section 363 IPC and Section 6, POCSO Act.

Background

The prosecution case arose from an incident dated 9 December 2015 involving a girl aged about 2.5 years. According to the victim’s mother, the child had gone to the appellant’s adjoining jhuggi while playing and was subsequently taken by him to Hans Raj City Park. The mother stated that, after the child returned home, she complained of pain while attempting to urinate and that she noticed blood on her pyjami. She further alleged that the child disclosed that the appellant had committed a penetrative sexual act with her.

On 11 December 2015, the victim’s mother lodged a complaint, pursuant to which an FIR was registered. Owing to her tender age, the victim was not able to give a statement under Section 161, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC). The prosecution examined 13 witnesses, including the victim’s mother, her uncle, and medical and forensic witnesses.

The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 363, IPC and Section 6, POCSO Act, while acquitting him of the offence under Section 506 IPC. He was sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹5000 under Section 6, POCSO Act and 1 year’s rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹3000 under Section 363 IPC. The High Court, by judgment dated 3 July 2025, affirmed the conviction, leading to the present appeals before the Supreme Court.

Analysis

The Court closely examined the evidence of the victim’s mother, the private doctor, the medical evidence, and the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report. It found material inconsistencies between the testimony of victim’s mother and doctor regarding the time and circumstances in which the child was allegedly taken to the doctor. While victim’s mother stated that she had taken the child to the doctor at about 9.30 p.m., the doctor stated that the child had been brought to him at about 4—5 p.m. The Court held that the discrepancy could not be treated as a minor contradiction, particularly when considered along with the other evidence.

The Court further found material improvements in the testimony of victim’s mother. According to her deposition, the appellant had told her that he had taken the child to the park to light a fire, and the child had allegedly narrated the penetrative sexual act to her. However, these material facts were not mentioned in the FIR, which constituted the first account of the alleged occurrence. The Court therefore found that the testimony of victim’s mother contained significant omissions and improvements affecting its credibility.

The evidence of doctor was also found unreliable. Although the doctor claimed to have noticed blood spots on the child’s pyjami and stated that he had informed the police about the alleged sexual assault, he had neither prepared medical papers nor provided treatment. Further, none of the police witnesses corroborated the doctor’s assertion that he had informed the police by telephone.

The medical and forensic evidence did not support the prosecution version. The doctor who physically examined the child found no injury or bloodstains over the vulval area and recorded that the hymen was intact without abnormality. The FSL examination detected neither semen nor male DNA on the relevant exhibits. The FSL expert also stated that blood could not be detected on the child’s pyjami. The Court observed that, in the circumstances of the present case, the medical and forensic evidence did not merely fail to corroborate the allegation but substantially contradicted the prosecution version regarding the alleged penetrative assault.

The Court clarified that absence of injuries or semen does not, by itself, disprove an allegation of rape. However, the present case stood on a different footing because the medical evidence, taken together with the FSL report and the contradictions in the ocular evidence, did not support the prosecution case and ruled out the theory of a penetrative act on the evidence available.

Referring to Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21, the Court reiterated that where the prosecution relies upon the testimony of a witness as the principal evidence, such testimony must possess the requisite quality and consistency to inspire confidence. Applying the principles concerning a “sterling witness”, the Court held that the evidence of victim’s mother did not satisfy the required standard, particularly as it contained material contradictions and was not consistent with the medical and forensic evidence.

The Court also considered the defence case that the complaint had arisen from previous enmity between the 2 sides concerning a common water connection. The evidence established that the appellant’s jhuggi was adjoining the complainant’s jhuggi and that disputes had arisen between the families regarding the sharing and collection of water. In the context of the inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence and the absence of medical and forensic support, the Court found that the defence version acquired evidentiary significance.

The Court noted that Section 29, POCSO Act creates a statutory presumption regarding the commission of specified POCSO offences, while Section 30 concerns the presumption of a culpable mental state.

The Court held that these presumptions are rebuttable and are not absolute. Section 29 does not mean that once an appellant is prosecuted under the POCSO Act, the prosecution version must automatically be accepted. Before the statutory presumption can operate, the prosecution must first establish the foundational facts constituting the alleged offence.

The Court emphasised that statutory presumptions cannot relieve the prosecution of its duty to place reliable evidence of establishing foundational facts. The presumptions cannot be treated as a direction to accept the prosecution case as “gospel truth” or to mechanically sustain a conviction merely because the POCSO Act contains a reverse burden.

The Court explained that Sections 29 and 30 operate as rules shifting the evidential burden. Once the prosecution establishes the foundational facts necessary for the presumption to arise, the burden shifts to the appellant to rebut it. However, the appellant is not required to establish his innocence beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant may rebut the presumption by demonstrating inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence, exposing gaps or improbabilities, pointing to contradictions between ocular and medical evidence, or otherwise presenting a defence which is reasonably probable.

The Court reiterated that the reverse burden does not alter the fundamental standard applicable to the prosecution. The prosecution must prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant, when seeking to rebut the statutory presumption, may discharge the evidential burden on the preponderance of probabilities.

The Court further held that the operation of Sections 29 and 30 cannot override the requirements of a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. Even in cases involving statutory presumptions, courts must objectively assess the evidence and must not allow the existence of the reverse burden to overshadow the normal principles governing criminal trials.

The Court observed that once the appellant successfully rebuts the presumption by exposing substantial weaknesses in the prosecution case, the presumption ceases to have operative force. The ultimate determination must be based on the entire evidentiary record.

The Court reiterated the settled criminal-law principle that where 2 views are reasonably possible on the evidence, the view favourable to the appellant must be adopted. Referring to Kali Ram v. State of H.P., (1973) 2 SCC 808, the Court stressed that the existence of a statutory presumption does not dispense with the prosecution’s obligation to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Decision

Applying these principles, the Court held that the prosecution evidence in the present case contained material inconsistencies and improbabilities and was not supported by the medical and forensic evidence. The appellant was therefore found to have successfully rebutted the prosecution case, and the statutory presumptions under the POCSO Act could not sustain the conviction.

The Court set aside the High Court judgment dated 3 July 2025 and the trial court judgment dated 21 August 2023 convicting the appellant under Section 363 IPC and Section 6, POCSO Act. The appellant was held not guilty and acquitted of the offences.

The Court directed that the appellant be released forthwith if he was in custody, unless his custody was required in connection with any other offence. The appeals were accordingly allowed.

[Deepak in JC v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1914, decided on 17-9-2026]

*Judgment Authored by: Justice N.V. Anjaria

Advocates who appeared in this case:

For Appellant: Mr. Pulkit Prakash, AOR Mr. S.S. Sastry, Adv. Mr. Ankur Gosain, Adv. Ms. Arushi Sharma, Adv. Mr. Harsh Raj, Adv. Mr. Gaurav Khanna, Adv. Ms. Nabira Farman, Adv. Ms. Ankita Sinha, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Davinder Pal Singh, A.S.G. Dr. N. Visakamurthy, AOR Ms. Seema Bengani, Adv. Mr. Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Adv. Mr. Udit Dedhiya, Adv. Mr. Bhuvan Kapoor, Adv. Mr. Mukul Singh, Adv.

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