पीओसीएसओ एक्ट की दायित्व धारणा निरपेक्ष नहीं: सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने पुरुष को बरी किया

Presumption Of Guilt Under POCSO Act Not Absolute: Supreme Court Acquits Man

Saima Anjum

18 Sept 2026 9:15 AM IST

"The court should not mechanically accept the ipse dixit of the prosecution riding on the provisions regarding presumption of guilt to give a stamp of approval to every prosecution even if they are absurd or improbable in its story."

The Supreme Court on Thursday (17.09.2026) acquitted a man convicted under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) and Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, now Section 137 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), holding that the statutory presumption of guilt under Section 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act is not absolute, and that once the accused successfully expose inconsistencies and non-corroboration, “the presumption of guilt would no longer remain effective.”

A bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice NV Anjaria ruled so while setting aside a Delhi High Court ruling that had upheld the conviction by the trial court, holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted for offences under Section 363 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and was sentenced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment under the POCSO Act along with a fine, and one year's rigorous imprisonment under Section 363. He was acquitted under Section 506 of the IPC (now Section 351 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023). An appeal was filed before the Delhi High Court, wherein the conviction and sentence of the appellant was upheld.

It was alleged that the complainant's (PW 5) two-and-a-half-year-old girl had gone missing while playing near jhuggi and was later found to have been taken by the appellant to a nearby park. On returning home, blood was noticed on her clothing, and she was alleged to have named the appellant. A chargesheet was filed under Section 363, 376, and 506 of the IPC and Sections 4 and 5 of the POCSO Act. Charges were framed under Sections 363 and 506 of the IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act.

Examining the depositions of the complainant and the private doctor consulted first, the Supreme Court found “manifest contradictions” between their versions, including a stark discrepancy in the time at which the child was allegedly brought for examination, and in who accompanied her. The Court observed that “this inconsistency could not be brushed aside to be a minor kind or insignificant in nature more particularly when read with the facts of the case and other attendant evidence.”

It also noted that certain material aspects of complainant's testimony were not in the FIR, and that the claim of having informed the police by telephone was not corroborated by any police witness, despite the FIR itself being registered two days after the alleged incident.

The Court relied on the medical and forensic evidence, which it found to be squarely at odds with the prosecution's account. While PW 1 claimed to have noticed reddishness on the child's private part, the doctor who had actually examined the child at AIIMS found no injury and no bloodstains over the vulva area, and recorded that her hymen was intact without any abnormality. The forensics expert (PW 8) testified that none of the seven parcels sent for biological and DNA examination showed the presence of semen or any male DNA, and that blood could not be detected on the child's clothing either.

The bench distinguished this from cases where absence of injury or semen does not by itself disprove an assault, relying on State of UP v Babul Nath, it held that the present case had “conspicuous differentiating factor inasmuch as the doctor's evidence, as highlighted above, read with the FSL report, completely ruled out the possibility of any penetrative act.”

Applying the standard for a sterling witness as laid down in Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v State (NCT of Delhi) and reiterated in Ganesan v State, the Court held that the complainant's evidence could not meet this threshold in light of the contradictions and lack of medical corroboration, holding that “the various gaps in the testimony of PW-5, contradictions with evidence of other witnesses and the FSL and medical evidence revealing quite contrary, the prosecution story led by the evidence of PW-5 never remained intact but miserably descended to the stage of lack of proof.”

The bench also noted that the defence's contention that the complaint stemmed from a pre-existing quarrel over a shared water connection between the two families's jhuggis, was substantiated through the complainant's own cross-examination, where she admitted to the common water connection and the factum of a quarrel. The Court, thus, held that “in wake of the inconsistent prosecution evidential version, further weakened by non-supportive medical evidence, the story of previous enmity on account of water-quarrel could gain cogent ground to become believable and acceptable. It could therefore be said that the complaint was a motivated one filled with ill-intention and out of enmity.”

Undertaking a detailed analysis of the presumptive provisions under the POCSO Act, the Court explained that Section 29 raises a presumption of guilt once foundational facts are established by the prosecution, while Section 30 presumes a culpable mental state, subject to rebuttal by the accused. The Court described these as “departure from the cardinal rule in criminal jurisprudence that the accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty.”

Further, the Court clarified that such presumptions are not absolute, relying on Bombay High Court's Navin Dhaniram Baraiye v State of Maharashtra that the presumption under Section 29 “would come into operation only when the prosecution is first able to establish facts that would form the foundation for the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act to operate.”

“The court should not mechanically accept the ipse dixit of the prosecution riding on the provisions regarding presumption of guilt to give a stamp of approval to every prosecution even if they are absurd or improbable in its story. At the end of the trial, the accused should not stand at a discount or at disadvantage only for the reason that the particular statute under which he is tried for the offence contains presumptive provisions about the guilt of the accused,” the bench held.

Tracing precedents like Naresh Kumar alias Nitu v State of Himachal Pradesh, Noor Aga v State of Punjab, and Gangadhar alias Gangaram v State of Madhya Pradesh, Court reiterated that while the accused's burden to rebut such a presumption is only to establish a preponderance of probability, the prosecution's burden to prove guilt in the first place remains beyond reasonable doubt, and remains undiminished by the existence of a presumptive provision.

Reiterating Kali Ram v State of Himachal Pradesh, the bench reiterated that where two views are possible on the evidence, the view favouring the accused must be adopted, and that reasonable doubt as to guilt must be resolved in the accused's favour regardless of its impact on public perception. It further observed that “the court should always undertake objective assessment and appreciation of evidence. Therefore, in addressing entitlement of the accused to the acquittal, the court should not overweigh itself with the provisions like that of Section29 or Section 30 of the POCSO Act.”

In the light of above, the Supreme Court held that the appellant had successfully rebutted the prosecution's case, and that the prosecution had failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It, thus, set aside the findings of the trial court and the Delhi High Court.

“Even if initially the provisions of Section 29 and Section 30 of the POCSO Act operated to raise presumption against the accused, the evidence of the prosecution manifested inconsistencies, improbabilities and material contradictions. The medical evidence was non-corroborative in all respects, suggesting the non-commission of offence on part of the appellant. The defence story put forth by the appellant was cogent and its evidentiary value had the effect of crumbling the prosecution story. In the total perspective of evidence on record, it could hardly be said that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the appellant,much less beyond reasonable doubt,” the bench held.

Case: Deepak in JC v State Govt. of NCT Delhi

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 952

Click here to read the judgment

Appearance:

For Appellant: Mr Pulkit Prakash, AOR; Ms Nabira Farman, Adv.; Mr SS Sastry, Adv.; Mr Ankur Gosain, Adv.; Ms Arushi Sharma, Adv.; Mr Harsh Raj, Adv.; Ms Sriti Kashyap, Adv.; Ms Ankita Sinha, Adv.; Mr Gaurav Khanna, Adv.; Mr Arjun Mohan, Adv.; Mr Avinash Singh, Adv.; Mr Venugopal Pillai J, Adv.

For Respondent: Mr Davinder Pal Singh, ASG; Dr N Visakamurthy, AOR; Mr Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR; Mr Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Adv.; Mr Bhuvan Kapoor, Adv.; Ms Seema Bengani, Adv.; Mr Udit Dediya, Adv.; Mr Mukul Singh, Adv.

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